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This COMCAD Working Paper is a reprint of an interview by Giulia Bistagnino with Prof. 
Thomas Faist, published 1 February 2018. The interview can be found online: 
http://www.euvisions.eu/welfare-liberal-interview/.   
 
 
Euvisions met Thomas Faist, Professor of Transnational Relations and Development Studies 
at Bielefeld University, in January 2018, on the occasion of the event ―Dieci anni di Mondi 
Migranti. Uno spazio per la ricerca sulle migrazioni―, hosted by the University of Milan.  
Giulia Bistagnino: I would like to start by asking you to elucidate a key idea proposed during 
your lectio magistralis, namely the ―liberal paradox‖ and its relationship with the welfare ques-
tion. Could you explain how this tension influences contemporary politics within the EU? 
Thomas Faist: Once cross-border migrants have made it into the territory of liberal states, 
there is a paradox between efforts adhering to human rights on the one hand and those con-
trolling the migrant population on the other hand. This has been called the ‗liberal paradox‘. 
Externalization of control through ‗remote control‘ of immigration countries in emigration 
countries – in the case of EU member states in North and West Africa, for example, ensures 
that this liberal paradox is not activated, at least not to the full.  
At first sight, this could also apply to what I would call the ‗welfare paradox‘, which holds that 
there is a tension between social rights for all on the one hand and the deregulation of social 
and labour rights and standards as part of a liberalizing global economy on the other. One 
may surmise that a decrease in immigration leads to fewer forced migrants competing with 
established non-migrants for public services and jobs. Yet the depiction of (forced) migrants 
as exploiting generous welfare states and competing in labour markets does not necessarily 
depend on high and increasing numbers of mobile border-crossers.  
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The Representative of Lybia addresses during the Panel discussion on the Role of local authorities in 
promoting inclusion of refugees and migrants, Palais des Nations. 8 May 2017. 
 
Restrictive policies in themselves, such as trying to keep migrants from reaching the shores 
of Europe, harden the image of migrants as potential economic competitors. Most of the op-
position to asylum-seekers in Europe nowadays comes from those authoritarian political 
forces who openly advocate the exclusion of ―others‖, for example, right-wing populist par-
ties. 
In a nutshell, the externalization of control has a clear effect on the liberal paradox: if mi-
grants do not make it into the immigration countries and/or if migrants can be expelled be-
cause their fundamental human rights can be taken care of someplace else (in countries of 
origin and transit), the state does not need to address politically this unwanted and unwel-
comed forced migrant ―surplus‖ population. With respect to the welfare paradox, the effects 
turn out to be more ambiguous. More restrictive migration control will even feed the culturali-
zation of forced migration, defining forced migrants as the ―other‖. It also leads to portraying 
ever more categories of asylum-seekers and migrants as illegitimate refugees and undeserv-
ing recipients of social rights. 
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From left to right, Marco Minniti, Italian Minister of the Interior, and Dimitris Avramopoulos, European 
Commissioner for Migration. 
 
One may suppose that, however unintentionally, remote control contributes to the securitiza-
tion of migration control (that is, the perception that migrants are a security threat, physically 
and to the welfare state), and – very important – does not necessarily assuage the feelings of 
threat exploited so skillfully by various political parties and movements across Europe and 
North America. Moreover, as events in recent years seem to suggest, in extending control 
afar and thus minimizing the number of migrants arriving, the externalization strategy has not 
helped to convince EU member states to cooperate in the distribution of the initial costs of 
protecting refugees 
GB: Do you think the ―liberal paradox‖ can be overcome? How? In particular, do you think 
that strategies of migration containment, based on an enhancement of the partnership be-
tween Europe and Africa and aimed at reducing inequalities and creating enticements for 
migrants to stay in their countries of origin, can be considered successful in solving the para-
dox, as Emmanuel Macron has recently suggested? 
TF: One of the main motivations of international organizations such as the World Bank, su-
pranational entities such as the European Union (EU), national states or NGOs to sponsor 
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economic development via financial remittances of migrants is to reduce the volume of cross-
border migration from the global South to the global North, for example, from Africa to Eu-
rope. Over recent years politicians across Europe have often claimed that higher levels of 
economic development (measured by per capita income and/or increased human develop-
ment symbolized by lower infant mortality and higher rates of literacy) would eventually lead 
to a decrease in international migration. 
Migration scholars, however, insist that—while this expectation may be borne out in the long 
run, considering demographic transitions and economic transformations—increased econom-
ic development correlates highly with increased international migration, expressed in con-
cepts such as the ―migration hump‖ or the ―inverted U-curve‖. As the latter term indicates, 
emigration is relatively low from regions with low or high levels of income whereas it is higher 
in those from an intermediate range. Think of countries such as Turkey or the Philippines 
which are sort of middle income countries when viewed globally and which have experienced 
relatively high rates of out-migration over the past decades. 
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Infographic: the 2015 migrant crisis. Numbers and directional flows. 
 
Needless to say, levels of income are an insufficient proxy to determine emigration rates – 
other proxies such as civil war or structural economic problems have to be also considered. 
But the inverted U-curve suggests that it is not the poorest countries not the poorest seg-
ments of the population which are the most likely to move across national borders. Nonethe-
less, seen in the long run, Macron tends to be right: higher levels of economic development 
work to decrease emigration rates somewhat. Although creating jobs points to an important 
driver of migration, it is not a panacea because it does not address the underlying root caus-
es of cross-border migration from the global South to the global North which consists of polit-
ical and economic structural inequalities. 
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GB: Another issue which has dominated European political debates in the past years con-
cerns migration within the EU, and in particular the problem of transnational welfare among 
Member States. The relevance of the problem can be easily spotted in the fact that restricting 
access to social benefits by mobile EU citizens has represented one of the most important 
problems discussed during the Brexit debate. How do you evaluate such problem? What role 
should be assigned to European and national institutions? Can a bottom-up approach consti-
tuted by social movements be effective in changing the debate about welfare provisions 
among the EU and help fostering an idea of Social Europe? 
TF: There is a clear hierarchy between various types of migrants with respect to legally sanc-
tioned access to social rights and services. At the top tier are those migrants who are now 
sedentary. This is so because it usually takes a while to get full residence and employment 
rights for EU citizens in other member states. The tier below is composed also of EU citizens 
in other countries but those who could be called circular migrants. Often, the rules regulating 
the transfer of contributions are complex. In short, this setup favours one-time migration, not 
repeat migration across the borders of EU member states. In the third tier we find non-EU 
citizens, that is, extracommunitari who, as a rule, do not enjoy freedom of movement and 
have limited access to labour markets. Politically, this freedom has been rejected by critics to 
mean the free movement of unemployment and poverty. 
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Given this hierarchy of (non-)citizen access to social rights and services in the EU, it is es-
sential to look at the underlying causes for conflicts over transnational social rights. Where 
social protection and migration are concerned, there is at present no prospect of harmoniza-
tion of status between third-country citizens and EU citizens, because national welfare states 
are not prepared to relinquish control over their employment markets and social protection 
systems to supranational institutions. 
This is easily illustrated by the example of freedom of movement for workers. Argentinians of 
Italian descent may adopt the citizenship of their ancestors; they then have the option of set-
tling not only in Italy, but in any other EU member state. Survey evidence on naturalization 
processes in Italy finds that better opportunities for moving to other countries was the second 
most chosen reason for wanting to obtain Italian citizenship. In these and similar cases, other 
member states have no control over the mobility of workers according to citizenship. What 
constitutes an employee, for example, is increasingly defined and determined by the EU 
Commission. Member states do have the ability to exercise control over individuals from third 
states, however. In this way, they use migration control and sometimes also naturalization 
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policies vis-à-vis third-country nationals to regulate their respective labour markets and, 
hence, working conditions, wage costs and (social) citizenship. Access to national citizenship 
thus becomes an indirect instrument for controlling labour markets and access to social 
rights. 
GB: In your lectio magistralis, you have stated that a dominant theory on the transnational 
social question is lacking: nowadays, no theory represents what socialism represented for 
the social question in the 19th and 20th Century. What role do you envisage for ideologies 
and political narratives in contemporary European politics in shaping the future of European 
integration? 
TF: Indeed, in contrast to the nineteenth century, alternative scenarios for the future seem to 
have multiplied. Nowadays, socialist and communist theories – including Marxism, anar-
chism, syndicalism – have been complemented by, among others, postcolonial, postnational, 
feminist, and postmodern perspectives. All of this means that the vertical hierarchies of class 
have to be complemented by the horizontal disparities of race, ethnicity, gender and addi-
tional heterogeneities.  
The pluralisation of theories help us to think of the (re)production of inequalities in more 
complex and adequate ways. In the classic version of the social question in the nineteenth 
and first half of the twentieth centuries, this agent clearly was a (social) class – the proletari-
at, in opposition to the bourgeoisie. Nowadays, even in postmodern approaches, the concern 
with inequalities but also with capitalism and democracy has not disappeared. Nevertheless, 
in order to be useful for tackling the contemporary social question which has both a vertical 
and horizontal dimensions, one has to decouple class from the previously assumed sover-
eignty of allegedly objective economic interests. Yet this needs to be done without dissolving 
it into identity politics or reducing it into a concoction of language. In order to defend the Eu-
ropean project and to include a stronger social dimension, we need to avoid both a single-
minded focus on identity politics and policies which usually end up in us vs. other politics and 
a backward-oriented politics on class to the detriment of other heterogeneities. 
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Black NFL players who have been protesting racism and police violence by kneeling in the United 
States. 
 
GB: Finally, in the last years, we have been experiencing a strong form of distrust and back-
lash against globalization, the political and economic elites, the EU, and we have seen the 
rise of populism in Europe. Do you think these phenomena constitute only a threat to the 
stability and future of the EU or also an opportunity to reform the Eurozone and the European 
Union? 
TF: One of the most important contemporary expressions of culturalization and racialization 
in Europe has been right-wing xenophobic populism. After all, migrants and refugees are the 
most visible sign of the second modern globalization and the concomitant social transfor-
mation. Anti-immigration feelings among the dominant population‘s electorates have been 
fostered and exploited by parties mobilising tensions related to growing inequalities not only 
in material wealth but also power between ―the elites‖ and ―the people‖. 
Certainly, anti-immigrant and more broadly anti-minority populism is related not only to mi-
gration but also to the loss of state legitimacy and, economically, nationalist protectionist 
trade and currency policies. We should not forget that right-wing populism at first sight ap-
pear as a corrective to the current market liberalizing regimes in Europe. Yet such a view is 
deceiving. In reality, right-wing populists are the beneficiaries of market radical, neo-liberal 
policies of many member state governments. What is worse, they seem to extend these 
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same policies and couple them with nationalist, protectionist and xenophobic elements. I do 
not yet see an emerging left-wing populist alternative, except in nascent forms such as Po-
demos in Spain. 
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